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Urban policy, city control and social catharsis: The attack on social frailty as therapy 
 
Abstract 
 
hƌďĂŶ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ďĞĞŶ  ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ? ĂƐƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ
management and homelessness programmes have been aligned with the aims of criminal 
justice and anti-social behaviour measures. In this article policies that tackle problem 
places, people and behaviours are interpreted as expressions of social anger and fear that 
are made tangible via periodic attacks on social marginality. Case examples are offered in 
which urban policies appear as a kind of social catharsis, or exorcising of fear/anxiety. Such 
urban policies appear to construct social vulnerability as a threat that thereby helps to 
trigger interventions that might help realise goals of urban renewal and release from 
worries about criminality and urban-social decline. This model of control and policymaking 
is developed by drawing on the emotional energies at the heart of cultural criminology and 
critical perspectives taken from contemporary urban studies.  
 
Keywords: cultural criminology, fear of crime, gentrification, revanchism, urban politics 
 
Introduction 
 
 ?DĂŶ ŝŶďůĂĐŬ ? What is your mission? To invade the favela and leave bodies on 
ƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ?ŚĂŶƚďǇKW, Paramilitary wing of the Rio de Janeiro police) 
 
Public policy, as collective action directed at common goals, has often been identified in 
broadly positive terms. Yet as criminologists are increasingly keen to state, the state may 
also enact socially damaging, punitive or violent interventions (Cohen, 2000). The central 
argument of this article is that many policy instruments are driven by the need in their 
architects and supporters to relieve the pressure of anxiety through aggression against the 
socially marginal and the spaces they inhabit. To this end, the paper charts a series of urban 
initiatives, arguing that they have the common objective of removing or eliminating 
unwanted or disorderly populations and districts. Such actions are rooted in resentment 
and fear directed at often politically scapegoated groups. Criminologists focusing on urban 
contexts have unpacked some of the ways frustrations with poverty and physical urban 
decay spurred projects focused on the aggressive erasure or re-making of cities (Hayward, 
2004). Examples emerge in aspects of city governance that focus on the apparent 
improvement of the city and the implicit control or removal of social groups deemed to be 
impediments to such goals. Such programs include extensive rounds of state-aided 
gentrification (Slater, 2004), public and private housing demolition (Allen, 2008), and the 
control of anti-social behaviour by public housing landlords (Flint, 2006). Such examples 
highlight the implementation of supposedly benign state policies to re-make places and 
tame those labelled as deviant, dangerous or intransigent so as to produce renewed and 
better organised cities. This article is an attempt to make sense of these policies by probing 
the deeper question of how public sentiment is harnessed to political projects that 
challenge or attack social vulnerability in urban contexts. 
 
The emotional landscape of urban life has been identified by Thrift as an important and 
under-studied aspect of city life P ?ĂŶŐĞƌ ?ĨĞĂƌ ?ŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚũŽǇĂƌĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇŽŶƚŚĞďŽŝů ?
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ƌŝƐŝŶŐŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƵďƐŝĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?Such concerns collide with the interests of cultural 
criminologists who have identified how the vicarious victimisation narrative proffered by 
the media, the processes of identity formation, and political polarisation are important 
drivers for many contemporary anti-crime policies (Ferrell, Hayward and Young, 2008; 
Wacquant, 2009). One key argument of this article is that many urban policy programs 
(state efforts at addressing unevenly distributed social problems and economic inequalities) 
in the UK and other Western countries can be interpreted as expressions of deep social 
anger and class resentments, rather than of ambitions to produce improved social and 
physical outcomes in cities. Such policies contribute as causes of a social catharsis that vents 
often prejudicial and ill-informed beliefs (such as that poor are essentially deviant or 
deserving of their condition or that migrants and minority ethnic groups are a threat to the 
dominant ideals or conditions of social life) about social groups labeled as oppositional to 
social, economic, and political goals (Young, 2007).  
 
Hayward identifies in much contemporary urban life the anxiety of urban populations about 
crime, migration, and social change (Hayward, 2004). For Young, this anxiety is a kind of 
modern  ?ǀĞƌƚŝŐŽ ?in which daily social life is replete with anger, but also a sense of 
powerlessness that  ?ƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƐ-out culprits and mobilŝƐĞƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? (Young, 2007: 10). This 
anger stems from a wider anxiety generated by contemporary forms of work insecurity and 
social change that unsettle otherwise reassuring habits and continuities  W a fear of social 
falling or abandonment in the face of rapid social change and increasing precariousness that 
form the basis of recent analyses of anger and labour market change today (Standing, 
2011). The expansion of precariousness, to encompass others beyond the lowest paid or 
most marginal groups, suggests the possibility of plummeting from relative privilege into 
insecurity or hardship. Such anxieties add momentum and energy to public debates about 
removing threats via policies with inflated mandates for crime and social control (Garland, 
2001; Simon, 2007). 
 
This article examines deceptive policies that obfuscate the deeper objective of removing the 
socially marginal or to destroy/remake the spaces they occupy, which are further seen as 
hindrances to the achievement of social, urban, and economic renewal. Certain policies act 
to designate these sites and groups as targets for the rage and scorn of diverse social groups 
who gradually perceive migrants, dilapidated spaces, areas of public housing and homeless 
street populations (among others) as beyond remediation without concerted action 
(Amster, 2008). Such policies are supported via an array of media reports and public policy 
goal-setting that portray such groups as dangerous, alien or as enemies to progress 
(Maruna et al., 2004). Such policies are cathartic in the sense that they recruit direct 
emotional energy toward renewal and release from fears and anxieties; supporting or 
voting for such programs may thus appear to offer a better future, free of the threats and 
impediments that the social detritus of neoliberal systems generates through its ordinary 
workings (Gough, Eisenschitz, and McCulloch, 2006). These policies are evident in the 
demolition and renewal of notable London public housing estates; the deportation of the 
French Roma population; the waves of destruction of Palestinian homes and livelihoods 
(Graham, 2009); death squads murdering street children in Latin America (Sluka, 2000); and 
the displacement of the urban poor through state-sponsored gentrification (Smith, 1996). 
These examples have a number of common features. Each takes as its target the politically 
weak, economically sidelined and socially different groups as manifest or latent targets. 
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Also, each seeks to discipline or remove what are seen as threatening groups or those 
deemed resistant to discipline and homogenization. Finally, such legislative political actors 
labour to justify their efforts and recruit support based upon a need to remake or renew 
urban spaces and identities. As Graham has argued, such policies are often inflected with 
military and market ontologies which rest: 
 
 ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ
even erasure of urban spaces. This operates either as a means to allay 
purported threats, or as a way of clearing new space for the exigencies of 
global-city formation, neoliberal production, or as urban tabula rasa necessary 
for the most profitable bubbles of real estate speculation. Central here are 
widespread invocations of exception and emergency in justifying such violent 
assaults, often against (demonized and fictionalized) urban, racial or class 
ĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ?(Graham, 2011: 12) 
 
It is not sufficient to label cathartic policies as simply punitive reactions or ideologically 
driven; we must also understand how collective identity and anger are ignited and stoked 
by social inequality (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991). In addition, we require a vocabulary to 
articulate how and why political actions may be used to harness rage and vengeful social 
sentiment. Smith (1996) and Appadurai (2006) have moved toward such a vocabulary, 
hinged on class-based formations of sentiment and as projects of ethnic affiliation, 
respectively. Yet the growth in inequality has yielded urban systems with deepening 
divisions between the affluent and excluded, between respectable and dangerous that 
motivate politicians to respond to and drive public concerns. The political designation of 
social differences like poverty and ethnic identity as markers of danger, difference, and 
otherness is under-written by media discourses that further enable strategies for 
remodeling, cleansing, displacing and excluding those who are deemed to be worthless, 
intransigent, or criminal (Young, 1999).  
 
Widespread commitments to neoliberal principles of market allocation and the use of 
austerity programs have eroded the municipal realm and led to a further re-sorting of cities 
via property markets (Ellison and Burrows, 2007) along with new foci for policing strategies 
(Atkinson and Helms, 2007). According to Wacquant (2008; 2009) and Wilson (1990, 1996), 
armies of reserve labour and welfare-dependent households in inner and outer cities are 
often experience concerted policy attention. Exotic and subterranean immorality, criminal 
industry and joblessness are identified in popular discourse as being located spatially and 
socially outside the boundaries of respectable society. This sense of division, of them and 
us, yields a more forceful politics, inflected by anger at the temerity of opposition, 
criminality, and deviation from constructions of prevailing norms. 
 
These conditions appear to be tributaries that feed an angry social torrent (Sloterdijk, 2012) 
in which simplistic debates about poverty and criminality are further agitated by media 
systems that generate emotional, knee-jerk political decision-making (Simon, 2007; 
Altheide, 2001). Political action is accelerated by public demand for action and such media 
coverage. These emotional and technological drivers are important considerations for 
analysing the speed and intent of policymaking that seeks scapegoats as it becomes more 
deeply intertwined with widespread psychological impulses and needs. Scripts of 
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condemnation, such as the UK Prime Minister ĂŶĚ,ŽŵĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?Ɛresponses to the 2011 
riots, shade key urban populations and spaces as antagonistic to respectable, included 
society and available as targets for forced reforms. Analyses of gentrification, indigenous 
urban policy in Australia, and the increased enmeshing of urban renewal and criminal 
justice policies are used here to help build an analysis of urban policy as an emotionally-
inflected domain that is aggressively patrolled by its proxies in the form of policing agents, 
public landlords, social workers, wardens and others. In the final section, I discuss the 
prospects for reforming or softening these patterns of political action.  
 
Civility and Anger in Political Life 
 
The idea that political, judicial, and civic life is founded upon disinterested forms of 
decision-making and fairness is an important development for understanding the nature of 
public life. Yet as writers like Sloterdijk (2010), Presdee (2000), and Wouters (2011) argue 
this tendency toward civility, civilisation and pacification is not assured. Contrary to the 
macroscopic assessment of Elias (Elias et al., 2000), civility and reductions in personal 
violence are subject to a high degree of variability. More importantly, those political, social 
and judicial elites whose mandate is predicated on benign care are completely capable of 
aggression themselves, ŽƌƚŽƚĂŬĞ^ůŽƚĞƌĚŝũŬ ?Ɛ thesis seriously, capable of channelling of the 
rage undergirding the psychodynamics of everyday social life.  
 
The civility manifest in public life may conceal the demands of respectable society and an 
angry working-class keen to face down the dangerous others mobilised by public politics. 
This is evidenced in peaceful suburbs as well as neighbourhoods stressed by criminality that 
call for increased safety and for policing agencies to tackle anti-social behaviour by 
removing social detritus from public view. Likewise, politicians are commanded ƚŽ  ?ĚŽ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ĂďŽƵƚthe incursion of public or mixed-income housing and to reduce the tax 
and fiscal burden of public programs. From such bases, we may identify the aggressive core 
of many public policies as vehicles by which social difference, scapegoated groups, and 
dangerous spaces can be attacked. Civility may be a mask concealing the truer face of 
middle and working-class rage, manipulated and misdirected working class resentment that 
nevertheless seeks to tame public spaces (Atkinson, 2003), welfare costs, and migration. 
Neil Smith captures this backlash well with the depiction of a revanchist or vengeful 
urbanism (1996) placed at the centre of his analysis of New York political life in the mid-
nineties where: 
 
 ?ĂŶƚŝƵƌďĂŶŝƐŵ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ  “ƚŚĞĨƚ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ? Ă
desperate defense of a challenged phalanx of privileges, cloaked in the populist 
language of civic morality, family values and neighbourhood security. More than 
anything the revanchist city expresses a race/class/gender terror felt by middle- and 
ruling-class whites who are suddenly stuck in place by a ravaged property market, the 
threat and reality of unemployment, the decimation of social services, and the 
emergence of minority and immigrant groups, as well as women, as powerful urban 
actors. It portends a vicious reaction against minorities, the working class, homeless 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ŐĂǇƐĂŶĚůĞƐďŝĂŶƐ ?ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?ƐĐƌĞĂŵŝŶŐůǇĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚ
ďǇƚĞůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵŝŶŐ ? ? ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
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For Smith, the examples of state-led gentrification, anti-homeless ordinances, and 
aggressive forms of community policing reflect the anger and fears of majority groups who 
reject progressive social programmes or nuanced understandings of social problems. As 
both Garland (2001) and Young (1999) have argued, complex social forces are rendered 
simple so the excluded can be attacked as outsiders, deviants, and criminals undeserving of 
support. Within contemporary urbanism, neoliberalism exacerbates the production of an 
urban poor at the margins of work, the welfare dependent, welfare excluded, criminal and 
incarcerated (Wacquant, 2009). Instead of a concern about the social costs of poverty 
(crime, rising health expenditures and education), there exists a shift toward technologies 
and policies that make it tenable to refuse the costs and intrusions of deprivation  W public 
austerity programmes, tax cuts, gated communities and SUVs, for example. These attempts 
at evading the consequences of rising inequality form the basis of a number of recent, 
dismal readings of contemporary politics that identify the decreasing influence of ideas 
about a public realm and social justice as well as a widening gulf between rich and poor 
(Judt, 2010; Harvey, 2010; Hutton, 2010) even as the costs of inequality are more clearly 
identified (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Dorling, 2014).  
 
The centrality of anger and fear in policymaking 
 
If action against excluded and vulnerable groups has been a growing trend, one way of 
understanding these shifts is to conceive of policy-making as a process through which social 
anger and resentments are focused and projected onto externalised and threatening 
groups. We can turn to theorists like Ost (2004), whose analysis reveals the hidden 
centrality of such anger withŝŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ůŝĨĞ ? &Žƌ KƐƚ ? ĐĂƉƚƵƌŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ ŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ  ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĂŶŐĞƌ ? ŝƐan essential means of attracting support through the creation of emotional 
connections: 
 
 ?ĂŶŐĞƌ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶůǇ ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇ ďƵƌƐƚƐ ŽŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐĐĞŶĞ ? ďƵƚ ŝƐ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƚŽ  ?ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ? ŶŐĞƌ ŝƐ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƚŽ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ďŽƚŚ ĂƐ Ă ĚŝĨĨƵƐĞ ?
untargeted sentiment citizens experience, usually economically, and as the emotion 
political organizers need to capture and channel, which they do by offering up an 
 ?ĞŶĞŵǇ ?ƚŚĞǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂƐƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?(Ost, 2004: 229) 
 
Where Marx had identified capital as  ?ĐŽŶŐĞĂůĞĚůĂďŽƵƌ ? ?ĨŽƌKƐƚ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ is viewed 
ĂƐ  ?ĐŽŶŐĞĂůĞĚ ĂŶŐĞƌ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐĂƵƐĞƐ ĨĞĞĚƐ ĂŶĚ
transmutes a diffuse social fury into projects that target  ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ? WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŶŽƚ ĂŶŐƌǇ only 
when elites  ?shout ?  ?KƐƚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝĞĨǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞĞůŝƚĞŝƐƚŽĞƐĐŚĞǁŐůŽĂƚŝŶŐ ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?, 
but negativity is built into ordinary political life as a means of garnering ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? /ŶKƐƚ ?Ɛ
analysis, anger stems from discontent created by capitalism and inequality, through which 
politicians seek to recruit political capital and selectively spew this force onto the objects 
supposedly generating these powerful emotions  W the nonconformist or those otherwise 
perceived to be troublesome by the community at large. Ost gives the examples of angry 
protests in the late 1960s by US civil rights campaigners as well as the way the Republican 
party slowly won over the Democratic Southern states by mobilizing white anger against 
civil rights  W seeking voters on the basis of emotional identities rather than rational self-
interest:  ?dŚĞĐŚŝĞĨĂǆŝƐŽĨĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚǁŚĂƚǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĨŽƌďƵƚǁŚĂƚǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ?tŚŽŽƌ
ǁŚĂƚŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝůůƐ ?ůĂĐŬƐ ?ĂŶĚŐƌŝĞǀĂŶĐĞƐ ? ? ?KƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
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Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, Ost sees the perpetual creation of binary 
friend/enemy distinctions as one of the main tasks of political life. Through these efforts it is 
not necessary to destroy the enemy, but rather to note that that enemy could destroy the 
self (the resonance with contemporary international politics is notable). For criminologists 
like Young (1999), these processes are at the heart of the demonization and othering of 
social groups perceived to be threatening and disorderly, locating such processes more 
generally within urban life. An age of anxiety left few clear guides to social action or safety 
and only a worsening social inequality that resulted in a perpetuation of crime, its 
increasingly  ?disorderliness ? (the rise of anti-social behaviour as itself a crime), and the 
merger of general disorder into the category of crime.  
 
Writers like Garland (2002) argue that rising crime in 1960s Western societies was 
important because it also touched the lives of higher income groups. This meant that a 
diffuse social anger lay not only in the inequality between classes, but also in the perceived 
theft of privilege and safety from the affluent and middle-classes. This connects well with 
^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛideas about urban revanchism and its roots in a gender-class-race terror 
underpinning a vengeful attack on the socially vulnerable. Such processes also appear to be 
generated by the geo-demographic position of social groups in the city. As Young notes 
(1999), gentrification increased the distance between high-income groups and  ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?, which further intensified feelings of insecurity. On a related point, commentators 
suggested ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ  ?ďĞĚƌŽŽŵƚĂǆ ?  ?ǁŚŝĐŚreduced housing welfare entitlements to 
those  ?ƵŶĚĞƌ-ŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚǁĞůůŝŶŐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ŵŽůůŝĨǇ the middle-classes by 
helping to price-out the poor from high market value areas.  
 
Young (1999) saw in contemporary social politics a condition akin to  ?ƐŽĐŝĂůďƵůŝŵŝĂ ? in which 
targeted groups (urban gangs, minority groups, anti-social youth) were either  ?ingested ? by 
incarceration or the less stringent ties of the criminal justice system, or vomited out and 
cordoned away from respectable, sanitized society in distant or enclosed public housing 
estates as modes of social risk management. Social geographies associated with risk 
produce what Young sees as an intricate map of no-go areas and avoidance behaviours, 
including self-imposed curfews or disaffiliation from public spaces. No doubt these patterns 
also create feelings of irritation and frustration at the inability of citizens to enjoy the right 
to live and move about unimpeded by fear or victimisation (Blomley, 2011, Herbert, 2008). 
For Maruna et al (2004), these processes are part of a broader attempt to destroy our own 
 ?ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ?, disowning those unfortunate enough to be superfluous to the economic system 
and whose subsequent abject position justifies further denials of sustenance by welfare and 
housing systems. 
 
Hate, anger, pleasure and fear appear as the critical components of contemporary culture 
ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ŝŶ WƌĞƐĚĞĞ ?Ɛ(2000) analysis. This helps explain how social anxiety and fury 
reviewed could be part of a wider culture of humiliation, featuring media saturation of 
social harms as a daily reality  W hate, scapegoating and criminality are now major focal 
points. For Presdee, crime and harm are not phenomena ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƐŽŵĞŚŽǁ  ?ŽƵƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ?;
rather, they are deeply woven into the cultural formats of which we are both witnesses and 
producers (such as phone video clips, Youtube or, reality cop shows). WƌĞƐĚĞĞ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐĞƐ
on the rise of humiliation in popular culture and the obsession with reality T.V. (e.g., UK 
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ŚĂŶŶĞů  ? ?ƐBenefit Street) illumines the need for catharis and illustrates why the socially 
precarious are attacked. People are drawn to the guilty, voyeuristic pleasure of observing 
the fate of others, but also need the kind of psychological release from anger and 
frustration that comes from a therapeutic encounter. Widespread social fear and anger, a 
culture of spite, and the nexus of media and political systems combine to produce a system 
with vicious politics: 
 
 ?ǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ?politicians cannot simply base urban policy on what `experts` 
define as scientifically evaluated best practice about what policies do and do not work. 
They also have to consider the raw play of power and the rhetorical pressing of buttons 
that evoke the darker human emotions, particularly of anger, resentment, jealousy, 
insecurity and fear of all those who are seen as invaders of the familiar spaces of what is 
considered to be homeland ?In these circumstances, visions of controlled, sanitised, 
safe spaces for consumption and other pleasures enjoy wide appeal across the social 
spectrum. Recent images of urban renaissance in this sense join a long lineage 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŵĞƚŚĞĐŚĂŽƚŝĐ ?ǀŝǀĂĐŝƚǇŽĨĐŝƚǇůŝĨĞ ? ?(Stenson, 2007: 37) 
 
For Breuer and Freud, the cathartic method allows a patient to relive traumatic events and 
to achieve a purging, therapeutic effect. Emotions spill out and neuroses are relieved. It 
seems useful to regard this pattern of emotional frustration and its subsequent release 
through therapeutic work as a metaphor for the kind of emotional processing conducted by 
political actors and institutions. The kind of impulsive, political aggression and knee-jerk 
reactions can be read as a deep social need for release from frustrations and fears. Class-
political revenges of this kind rely on depictions of the victimisation of respectable society 
so that punitive policies can be justified by political entrepreneurs (Tilly, 2003). The 
democratisation of anxiety has resulted in deepening and more generalized worries about 
the risks present in late (Beck et al., 1994), anxiety-provoking, indeterminate modernity 
(Bauman, 2006), all of which produce deeper forms of social unease. Lipovetsky argues:  
 
 ? ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŚĂƐ ŝŶǀĂĚĞĚ Ăůů ŵŝŶĚƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŚĂƐ ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ĂƐ Ă ŵĂƐƐ
obssession; terrorism, catastrophes and epidemics are regularly front-page news...The 
only real question now is that of protection, security and the defence of social 
benefits...The climate of the first period has faded, giving way to a now ubiquitous 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? (2005: 39) 
 
Because these demands appear to generate a hardening of dispositions toward the 
excluded and dispossessed as well as collectively resourced municipal functions and 
provisions (Judt, 2010) , we can identify cathartic policies and actions where they satisfy the 
following conditions:  
 
i. They respond to patterns of frustration and obstruction (the need to regenerate a 
particular locality; the use of disproportionate police force); 
ii. Their pŽůŝĐǇ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƉŽŽƌĞƌ ? ƐŽĐŝĂůůǇ  ?ŽƚŚĞƌĞĚ ? Žƌ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ outcasts who are 
portrayed as intransigent, irreconcilably different or sources of social anxiety 
(migrants to British cities, the singling out of the Roma population as a source of 
crime in Italian cities, the targeting of anti-social youth); 
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iii. The sense that policies will offer relief from public anger and worry (e.g., stop and 
search policing as a means of combatting knife or drug crime, the use of identity 
ĐĂƌĚƐĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŬĞĞƉŝŶŐŽƵƚ  ?ŝůůĞŐĂů ? ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ŝŶƚŚĞh< ? ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ?ƉĞĂĐĞǁĂůů ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁĞƐƚ bank in Israel). 
 
In many cases, these policies lead to cycles of further regressive actions and reforms that 
are more likely to prevent the ultimate resolution of fear and anxiety since they tend to 
worsen the conditions that generate those problems, as in the example of politically 
vilifying urban youth in the Parisian banlieues and those in London after the 2011 riot, 
rather than investing in work opportunity and diversionary programs. Despite this self-
defeating character of aggressive urban polices, there is a worrying tendency for them to be 
used as springboards for tough, punitive action, as the following case studies illustrate.  
 
Case studies in urban catharsis 
 
A series of more specific examples of the deployment of public anger through urban policy 
are now considered here as bundles of action that seek to dispossess those who threaten 
urban safety and a revitalised economic prosperity through aggressive criminal justice 
policies, housing policies and other related forms of creative destruction in urban contexts 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002).  
 
Revanchism and gentrification 
 
For Neil Smith (1996), housing strategies, investments and policing decisions in New York 
city were part of an emotional backlash against the poor and marginal. The actions of the 
local state within a broader political-economy sought the displacement of the poor and the 
visible homeless in order to ŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇin their wake ?^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ
of these programmes roots these efforts in feelings of ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛelite, 
vented by plans to revitalise and gentrify the urban core while displacing the homeless and 
low-income households , thus realising both financial and social goals by inflating real estate 
values and clearing away poverty to the margins of the city, and by extension, its cost.  
 
As Clark (2005) argues, these actions were preceded historically by urban renewal--
dislocation engineered by privileged elites in the past. As he observes, these battles did not 
begin with the coining of the word  ?gentrification ? by Ruth Glass in 1964; earlier waves of 
urban renaissance in eighteenth century Southern Europe exposed elite reactions to the 
problems of urban congestion and criminality. These programs expressed both anger and 
frustration at the emergence of urban problems that impinged on local social elites. The rise 
of revolutionary power in cities like Paris suggested the need to truncate more direct 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŽĨ ƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚ ?,ĂƵƐƐŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞ-modelling of central Paris is well-known to have been 
spurred by the public aim of improving health and circulation, but had the more obvious 
effect of clearing a dangerous revolutionary and criminal class by building wide streets to 
prevent occupation and barricading. As Blomley notes, such revitalization and the 
displacement of the socially marginal continues in contemporary acts of renewal: 
 
 ?DŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă ĐůĂƐƐ-ďĂƐĞĚ  “ƌĞǀĂŶĐŚŝƐŵ ? ? ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐƉĂĐĞ ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĞŶ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ
intensified surveillance and policing as the streets and parks of the city have become 
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occupied by those evicted or squeezed from urban private space. Expressed through a 
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽŽƌ ĂŶĚ ŚŽŵĞůĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ƐŚƌŝůů ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ŽĨ  “ǌĞƌŽ-ƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?  “ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ĨĂƚŝŐƵĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ
ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĐůĂƐƐŚĂƚƌĞĚ ?ƚŚŝƐ “ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐŚĂƐŝƚƐƌŽŽƚƐ ?ƐŽŵĞĂƌŐƵĞ ?ŝŶĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐ
ŽǀĞƌƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽŐĞŶƚƌŝĨ ĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?(Blomley, 2004: 31) 
 
Smith uses the idea of a modern, urban form of revanchism as an interpretive framework to 
understand the social, political and economic transformations coalescing in mid-nineties 
New York. As he (Smith, 2002) argues, not only has gentrification become generalised as a 
series of local policy frameworks, this conception of unchecked political hostility has also 
become extremely apposite to an appreciation of broader changes affecting other cities, 
countries, and political projects globally. Operating through the housing market 
(gentrification and the take-over of working class neighbourhoods by the privileged), 
policing (zero tolerance policing) and welfare retrenchment, this form of political action has 
been applied by social scientists in other North American (Slater, 2004, Wyly and Hammel, 
2005), British (Atkinson, 2003), and Western European (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008) 
contexts, among others. In short, there appears to be much more to say about a vengeful 
politics that now appear more as a feature of urban social and political life today than was 
even supposed by Smith when he first proposed his thesis. 
 
As Blomley argues, in many cases the imperative driving such renewal is the economic and 
moral re-making of the city through the assertion of specific property relations that 
ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĂůŽŐŝĐŽĨ ?ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂŶĚďĞƐƚƵƐĞ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŐĞŶƚƌification is currently applied as state 
sponsored policy in many cities. The core rationale connecting these disparate actions in 
contemporary urbanism is the attempt to commodify central city spaces that promote 
circuits of capital accumulation through property, rather than the deadweight expenditures 
of social programs, like housing and welfare. As Blomley argues, this idea of a highest and 
best use in planning has an almost ontological position in language dictating the re-shaping 
of the city. It represents: 
 
 ?ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ Ă ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ Ă ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ  W highest and best use, in other words. The 
highest and best use of urban land is a moral imperative and a necessary expectation. It 
is inevitable, natural, and beneficial ?abandoning a logic of community and 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ? ?ůŽŵůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
This deep status of property relations is such that gentrifiers, city policy elites, and many 
displacees see the value of space not in its habitability, but rather as a commodity. Urban 
policy, planning and local economic development programs often cast particular social 
groups and spaces as threats to reform, progress, and prosperity. In political and media 
treatments of run-down neighbourhoods or homeless street populations, narrative devices 
are regularly used to define them as blockages, a potential thwarting of ambitions to mend 
and improve the fortunes of the city and contributing citizens. Much of the vision applied to 
particular urban places and communities suggests a similar logic of frustration at their 
ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ  ?ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ƌŽƐƐ ŝŶ >ŽŶĚŽŶ ? dŝŵĞƐ ^ƋƵĂƌĞ ŝŶ EĞǁ zŽƌŬ, and the 
Indigenous area of Redfern in Sydney), heralded by Smith as a kind of writing-out of those 
who lack rights to the city:  ?ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĞǆƉĞĐƚ Ădeepening villainization of working-class, 
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minority, homeless and many immigrant residents of the city, through interlocking scripts of 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ĚƌƵŐƐĂŶĚĐƌŝŵĞ ? ? ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
Anti-homeless policies 
 
The idea of the creative city as a space of attraction for talent, innovation, and tolerance has 
been a central influence of much urban policy over the past fifteen years or so. Yet as Peck 
(2005) argues, the pursuit of skilled labour has often been responsible for zero-tolerance 
policing and other forms of social hostility. &ŽƌĂůůƚŚĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚŚŽůĞƐŝŶ&ůŽƌŝĚĂ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
(2002; 2005), many cities still promote forms of urban liveability to draw mobile talent. For 
Peck, such policies occur within neo-liberal modes of urban governance that forcibly 
reconstruct cities as sites of purity in the eyes of incoming professionals and capital 
investment. Far from being about tolerance, the global scramble to manufacture creative 
cities for a peripatetic worker-elite has generated a new economic rationality that is used to 
capture economic investment via the dislocation of local others  W down and outs, the 
homeless, and other visible harbingers ŽĨ ?ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ǁŚŽĂƌĞĐŽŶĨůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇĂƐĂ
means of legitimating strong, erasing action (Amster, 2008). Thus the congealed anger of 
urban governance helps to fertilise policies reflected in the emerging environment: 
 
 ?ďǇƚŽǁŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ďǇƌŽĂĚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐǁŚŝĐŚĚŝǀŝĚĞĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ďǇƚŚĞŐĂƚŝŶŐŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?
by the blocking off of areas ĨƌŽŵĞĂƐǇĂĐĐĞƐƐ ?ďƵƚĂďŽǀĞĂůůďǇŵŽŶĞǇ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŝƚ
involves private or public police, is aimed at removing uncertainties, of sweeping the 
streets clean of alcoholics, beggars, the mentally ill and those who congregate in 
ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ? ?zŽƵŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Efforts to erase and overwrite ƚŚŝƐ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĚĞƚƌŝƚƵƐ ? ĂƐ ǁŝƚŚ DŝŬĞ ĂǀŝƐ ? ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ Ă  ?ďƵŵ-
ƉƌŽŽĨ ?ďĞŶĐŚŝŶCity of Quartz (1991) (see Figure 1), provide insight into the ultimate ends of 
many contemporary urban interventions  W the systematic surveillance, displacement, and 
continuous circulation (Wacquant, 2002) of those deemed at any one policy moment to be 
ƚŚĞ  ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐ ŵĞĚŝĂ-political system. Caught between park benches 
segmented to make sleep impossible, private pavements managed by private improvement 
districts, and the withdrawal of social services and residential facilities, the kind of 
capitalism in which these groups flourish now seeks to cut its side of the social contract 
while blaming the downtrodden for sealing their own fate and legitimating punitive forceful 
action. This has produced interstitial and low-value urban spaces (ironically championed by 
Florida as places of embryonic creativity) where some sanctuary might be found, but have 
been largely overtaken and scarified by capital investment in what Ritzer has described as 
the globalization of nothing (Ritzer, 2007). This creates vast tracts of franchise capitalism 
and indistinct places divorced from human need, while poorer groups are cordoned-off and 
away from the fearful gaze of respectable groups.  
 
Indigenous policy 
 
ůŽŵůĞǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƵƌďĂŶ ĂďŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ highlights how local rights to 
occupy urban space encounter periodic challenges and confrontations. In Canada, Blomley 
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has recorded the effect of recent colonisation on an extensive displacement, yet in Australia 
these processes arguably remain in progress. The targeting of Aboriginal communities has 
been particularly apparent under successive Australian Federal governments, but are 
increasingly so in the current round of welfare reforms that have made urban life 
intolerable (Atkinson et al., 2010). Initiatives directed at public drinking, homelessness, and 
the forcible repatriation of transgressors to originating communities demonstrate a 
particularly vicious form of what Mitchell describes as the annihilation of space by law 
(1997). These themes of indigenous urban life, regeneration, and political hostility are 
unpacked in this case study. 
 
The use of punitive policy measures in the pursuit of social betterment such as the 
reduction of public street drinking or anti-social behaviour function as proxies for the de 
facto targeting of urban Aboriginal society. While the Federal immigration minister has 
openly discussed the unsustainability of remote Aboriginal settlements, the inner-city 
Aboriginal population is packaged as an idle and intransigent problem, singled-out through 
continued iterations of socio-legal attempts at disruption. The withdrawal of welfare 
ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚƌƵĂŶƚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŵŽŶĞǇ ĨŽƌ  ?ƐŝƚƚŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
national/Murdoch press, has been directed exclusively at particular Aboriginal communities. 
On the other hand, problems of direct health harm, like petrol sniffing by young fatalistic 
Aborigines, incur immense pressure to stir Federal and State government action. Relevant 
here are the impressions of an indigenous counter culture of urban Australians used to 
justify both punitive policing programmes and attempts at displacement in order to raise 
the real estate value of the land they occupy (in areas like central Sydney). 
 
Ironically, long-standing urban aboriginal communities represent a gift--devalorising choice 
segments of centrally located urban real-estate, creating significant rent gaps. The market 
intransigence of the Indigenous population has resulted in outrage embedded in policies 
that make more likely the regeneration of Redfern, an extensively Aboriginal area in Sydney. 
As property values and rents escalate stratospherically, the apparent illogicality of 
Indigenous residents as Ă  ?ĨƌĞĞůǇ ? ŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐ ŐƌŽƵƉ is viewed by some as increasingly 
untenable. Yet it is also the broad socio-spatial concealment of Aboriginal problems from 
white Australia that exacerbates the sense of otherness of these problems, fuelling Liberal 
party rhetoric on unsustainable communities as it diminishes any prospect of social 
empathy through local contact while fuelling anxiety and punitive discretionary urban 
policies and practices towards the community (Atkinson, Taylor and Walter, 2010). 
 
Housing market renewal 
 
In the UK and US, market confidence is often seen as the saviour for problems of low-
demand and high crime urban areas. Housing programs like HOPE VI (US) and the Housing 
Market Renewal Pathfinders areas (UK) have promoted homeownership and clearance as 
the means by which faith in the city and a growing commodification of city space can be 
achieved. Through a process of demolition (more than 10,000 homes to date, DCLG data) 
and subsequent community displacement and renewal, this programme has had a 
significant impact on the seven large areas in northern cities in the UK. As analysts like 
Cameron (Cameron, 2003) have argued, these visions tended to exclude low-income 
residents. Like urban indigenous Australians, existing residents helped to devalue and 
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devalorise these areas and as a reward, have been scripted out of their future. Following 
^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƐůŽŐŝĐŽĨƵŶĞǀĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌĞŶƚŐĂƉƐ ?ƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞĚŶŽŵĂĚŝƐŵŽĨƉŽŽƌŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶ
the city will ĂůƐŽ  ?help ? to devalue other areas in order to make them ripe for cheap 
investment in the future.  
 
In the case of the HMRPs, it is no longer acceptable for such neighbourhoods and their 
residents to escape a logic of place-based commodification. This is reflected in the kind of 
strong paternalism marking recent urban policies that have moved away from models of 
community consultation in the pursuit of a singular vision for these neighbourhoods. This 
vision must not be frustrated by engagement with a population largely conceived as 
tenurially (renting from the state) and socially deviant. Emerging evidence suggests that 
homelessness has increased in the areas where the Pathfinders have operated. As Atkinson 
indicated (2004), the market renewal of the Pathfinders is attached to a geography of low 
demand housing largely made-up of social, rented dwellings. Thus a major aspect of the 
implementation of the Pathfinders is to identify strategies and solutions to commodify 
these neighbourhoods so that capital over-accumulation, particularly from household and 
investment finance elsewhere, can be brought into play in these spaces. Fuelled by privately 
directed mandates and significant public monies (approaching £1bn), the sense of liberation 
at these clearances among their private policy directors is palpable in the accompanying 
strategic documentation. 
 
Urban policing and criminality 
 
Urban policy has now merged with other state objectives, particularly those focusing on 
criminal matters (Atkinson and Helms, 2007). As Atkinson and Helms describe it, this 
criminalisation of urban policy evinces the infusion of political anger directed at sink estates 
and problem people like migrants and welfare recipients, even while these spaces and 
groups are the most likely to be victims of crime. Within the national politics of the UK, a 
range of political programs have been initiated because of the belief that an ordinary, 
decent society has been held hostage by an unruly minority whose behaviour ranges from 
anti-social behaviour and minor criminality to physical and verbal abuse (Flint, 2006). Such 
anxieties found their apotheosis in political diagnoses of the UK urban riots of August, 2011. 
The whiplash response of the right of centre coalition government was to quickly assert the 
role of organised gangs and straight criminality with little or no evidence. These rationales 
were given without reference to the context of the unrest--grossly unequal cities and 
publicly degraded services, symbolically appropriated by gentrification and the loss of 
employment and affordable housing. Little was said concerning the role of discretionary 
policing in the form of stop and search policies, the deep resentment fomenting over time, 
and the racially charged interaction between police and minority-ethnic young men in these 
areas. 
 
The socio-legal aspects of urban policy burgeoned with the growth under the UK New 
Labour project of ASBOs, the four hundred Child Curfew Zones in England, and new 
Business Improvement Districts. ASBOs have been targeted with discretion by city regimes 
against prostitutes, travellers and young teenagers (often publicly named and shamed) and 
often driven by central government politicians seeking punitive and effective sanctions 
against particular groups and communities cast as major threats to public order or quality of 
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life. There is little doubt that anti-social behaviour is a major problem, often in precisely 
those locales where fractured social cohesion has resulted from profound economic stress 
and decline. Yet such civil remedies have become powerful tools that feed on local anger at 
particular social groups seen as problems, their troubled personal and local histories 
ignored. 
 
Themes of anger and action through policy and policing can also be seen in ĂůĚĞŝƌĂ ?Ɛ
empirical analysis of crime and punishment in City of Walls (2000). There she finds that 
many of the most punitive personalities are located in the deprived ghettos of Rio, where 
support for anything less than the full punishment of criminals is seen as untenable. Many 
ŽĨĂůĚĞŝƌĂ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞƵse of the death penalty and absence of rights for 
criminals who are seen as less than human, a monolithic mass of beasts who create an 
economic burden that is intolerable, more so given their crimes. In this emotional context, 
revenge is exacted through police mandated to use violence. They fear setting any 
boundaries that might protect criminals and render the poor more vulnerable. The 
conception and pursuit of truth through pain is linked by Caldeira to Western religious and 
political traditions, but also to a socio-economic context in which incredible inequalities 
both devalue and endanger the poor. This devaluation of life suggests not only a means by 
ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐĂŶĚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚďǇƉŽŽƌŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶĞůŝƚĞ
privilege, mocking the potential rights of common citizens. Here social rights (and 
secondarily political rights) are historically far more legitimated than individual and civil 
rights, ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ  ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ďŽĚǇ ? ĂƌĞ ďƌŽĂĚůǇ ƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĚ, leading to 
support for strongly punitive sanctions: 
 
 ?WĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĂĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ƚŚĂƚďǇƉĂƐƐ ƚŚĞ
legal order, and they think of punishment as inflicting suffering on the body. Their 
reference, therefore, is the universe of private, immediate, and usually very physical 
revenge. This universe offers a specific conception of the body, and especially of the 
infliction of pain as a means to moral and social development. This conception applies 
not only to criminals but to many ƐƉŚĞƌĞƐŽĨƌĂǌŝůŝĂŶůŝĨĞ ? ? ?ĂůĚĞŝƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many urban policy initiatives speak of a broad socio-political transformation by which a line 
has been drawn under progressive policies and a fury is discharged against those deemed to 
be the barriers against city renewal and social wholeness. These processes are relevant to 
criminology because they offer a deepened understanding of the means by which harms are 
understood within political systems and acted upon in relation to keen senses of social 
difference that are themselves socially and spatially structured. Rage can be located in a 
complex interplay of contemporary politics, accelerated media systems, public resentments 
and deep anxieties generated by the economic imperatives and harms created by 
contemporary and historical forms of capitalism played-out in the urban domain. In many 
such contexts, we can locate spaces and spatially delimited social groups that are  
considered hindrances to the ambitions of bureaucrats and politicians, and these are the 
socio-spatial targets of cathartic policies.  
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The contemporary social politics of the global West has found new depths through the 
splicing of instinctual needs into policy devices that treat particular groups and spaces 
through exceptional means (the designation of emergency conditions that facilitate 
extraordinary policy measures), ostensibly in the name of releasing social and economic 
projects for a greater good. Ironically, the rise of affluence has generated self-perceptions 
of vulnerability amongst elites, given the apparent unpredictability and danger attached to 
those left outside the gilded bubble blown by internationalised finance and service-driven 
economies.  Cathartic policing and renewal have become attached to these social groups 
and the spaces they inhabit, in projects that seek firm resolutions to the frictions and 
externalities generated by growing inequality. This occurs by hiding poverty in containers 
(such as prisons and ghettos) or alternatively through forms of housing displacement and 
even the literal destruction of life through urban warfare and extra-judicial killings in the 
most extreme examples (such as Latin America).  
 
Both anger and fear are recruited by political actors, by media and entertainment machines 
within which fantasies of total control have not only become significant themes, but which 
also encapsulate public desires for security and punishment. These constellations of 
powerful, instinctual social forces form the conditions by which cathartic modes of public 
policy and intervention become realisable objectives. Therefore, the definition and 
affirmation of social in-groups and political constituencies come together either as a sense 
of national identity (scaled around a drive to destroy those who are against  ?us ? as a state) 
or a social politics of privilege and ambition (drawn around social cleavages of class and 
affluence and a disorderly and dangerous urban underclass). Yet at both scales, the effect is 
similar--the generation of direct and unimpeded public actions that seek to neutralise or 
destroy hindrances in diverse forms. 
 
In this environment, there is no place for understanding. To do so is to blur the binary 
options on the table  W with us/ against us, criminal/ citizen, respectable / disorderly. Such 
simplicity also provides the anxious with comfort when faced with complexity, history, and 
the possibility for human empathy. It thereby becomes important that articulations of 
policy are capable of bolstering monolithic in-group identities so that the dehumanised, 
extra-legal, or exceptional status of groups and spaces can be more clearly identified and 
then tackled. In such circumstances, the vengeful actions of the state in its various forms 
and partnerships take on powerful acts of transcendence by which individual social actors 
achieve collective retribution.  
 
These observations help us to understand how urban and national political life generates 
further harms for those already excluded and ostracised. In this context we might well ask if 
optimism is logical. In suggesting that policy can act as a collective release focused on vocal 
concerns linked to social difference, disorder, crime, and decaying spaces, it is unclear how 
to break the current downward spiral. There is a deep momentum to socio-political life that 
is driven not only by desires for political power, but also because this circuit of institutional 
life operates within a transformed media landscape, driving fear and compressed reactions 
to complex political problems. Spatially targeted policies founded on these emotions 
connect effectively with individualised experiences of slight or injury, but also achieve a 
mandate precisely because they connect with intuitive, gut reactions to a broad range of 
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socially complex problems. The political or civic project that can effectively challenge these 
embedded forces is difficult to imagine. 
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